So my gut instinct when thinking about our approach to Syria is to stick with a hands-off policy: take no action that might be called an active intervention, though passive exercises of pressure like economic sanctions are fine. If I'm honest with myself, then I have to admit that a big part of that reaction comes from my doubts that military intervention would succeed rather than lead to a new Iraq or Afghanistan-like quagmire. Certainly there are military considerations (especially the geography) that make a Syrian expedition more doubtful than the Libya campaign. But really, I'm just afraid of being wrong, and of the potential damage to the prestige of my political ideology and my country if I am.
Well that's a bad reason to take a position on anything, and I would really hate the appearance of doing that. So my next worry is that I end up advocating the invasion or bombing of Syria just to look ideologically consistent. That's another terrible reason to do something, and an indication that it's time to shut down this whole line of thinking and approach the problem from another angle.
I'm certainly an idealist, but I do like to believe that I have a decent appreciation of practical realities, and that I adjust my positions on issues to take these into account. Still, I think it's useful in this situation to set aside practical objections and contemplate an ideal scenario. Given the current violent and cruel suppression of political dissent and unrest in Syria by the government of Bashar al-Assad, what would be the best possible response by the outside world?
To my mind, the answer is a unanimous condemnation of the Syrian Government by the whole of the United Nations, the authorization of an invasion by the blue-helmets, with soldiers drawn from every significant national army including those of the five permanent Security Council members, the destruction or other pacification of Syria's military and secret services by said UN forces, and the removal of Assad's government. Follow that with a long-term deployment of peacekeepers to police the country while overseeing the formation of a competent representative government, and provide generous financial and technical assistance from every UN member until a functioning and reasonably prosperous economy is entrenched.
And then we can all ride unicorns along a rainbow road to the sky. But that is the ideal outcome. That is how the world would respond to Syria if every other nation were as altruistic and determinedly righteous as I wish they were. It's not a plausible scenario because the world isn't that noble, but it gives me a starting point from which to approach other options.
It occurs to me that the important conclusion from that exercise may be that external military interventions can be justified as a response to the sort of evil taking place in Syria. In other words: stopping Assad would be righteous. And having reached that conclusion, the question for me becomes why wouldn't I advocate stopping him? What other considerations might mitigate the ethical good of rescuing Syrians from their dictator?
I believe I hinted at a big part of the answer in my Libya essay, and it is implied in my ideal scenario above. I'm an internationalist (and there's another label I can add to my list). I believe that the United States is the best country in the world, and I have no problem with the use of American might to help transform the rest of the world into a better place in that image. But even better than a peaceful, liberal, and democratic world secured by the United States would be that same world secured by a commitment from all humanity. I think that the United States should pursue a foreign policy with a long-term objective of establishing and strengthening international institutions and politics which are not only dedicated to the same ideals that we are, but are capable of defending them with our help and, eventually, in our stead. There's quite a bit more I could say about that ideology, but I don't want to launch into it in this essay. Instead I'll merely let it stand that this is one of my major goals when thinking about politics and policy, and return to focus on the implications of that goal for my policy towards Syria.
Well then, as much as I think an intervention might be justified on moral grounds, the context of my internationalist objective may well mean that it's a bad idea. Every time we bypass the United Nations in order to fix problems like Syria on our own, we make it more difficult to realize a world where the UN has the willpower and the teeth to address those problems itself. We undermine the legitimacy of the UN as an authority capable of enforcing decisions and resolving international disputes. And we piss off all the UN members who opposed our actions, making it harder to get them on board the next time we try to pursue our objectives through the UN.
It was a good thing that we got UN authorization for the Libya campaign. But it was a bad thing that we had to rely on a dubious interpretation of that authorization in order to expand the scope of the operation to the level that we wanted. If we want the good results to outweigh and outlast the bad, then it's important to emphasize the UN authorization of Libya going forward, and de-emphasize the impression that it was just a cover for us to do what we were going to do anyway. Unfortunately, that may well mean abandoning hopes for a more forceful response to Syria in order to bolster the legitimacy of the UN. After Libya, Russia is almost certainly not going to approve any Security Council resolution that could provide the tiniest particle of an excuse to use force against Assad. My read of China is that they'd be just as queasy about the precedent, but disinterested enough in Syria itself that they wouldn't go out on a limb to stop a resolution without Russia's cover. Still, the result is that, if we want a better UN, then we'll need to be willing to stand idle and watch the slaughter in Syria run its course.
That basically means selling out the Syrian people to a vague and distant ideal. It also means risking the impression that we fought in Libya for the oil, and don't really care about Syria because of its negligible reserves. The latter concern is a pet peeve of mine, and though it's frustrating it does not constitute a good reason to advocate a policy. But the first point is a brutal, terrible truth. I do think the cost may be worth it (easy for me to say, but then just avoiding the appearance of being unsympathetic is also a bad reason to take a position), so that the ends would justify the means. But if we do take that position, then we have a moral imperative to do everything within the limits of our power and imagination to make sure that we eventually realize the end goal, and do it as quickly as possible.
Or we could kick the can down the road. Intervene in Syria to satisfy our consciences now, and focus on reforming the global order afterwards. I can't even say that I would be all that unhappy with that option. It would be a right thing, even if not the wisest thing. But I think I'd rather we accept the larger responsibility and see to accomplishing that objective soonest. Our ability to always take it up again in the future is not a certainty.
In happier thoughts: foregoing military intervention in Syria doesn't have to mean doing nothing through the UN. We can and should step up our efforts to get help from Russia, China, and Syria's regional neighbors in putting pressure on Assad. Reassurances that we've ruled out the use of force without very explicit approval from the UNSC may help on that front. And we can still take some punitive measures. Each new round of sanctions that we extract from of the UN is good, but we can do more to link them to the oppression. Sanctions, when passed, should be issued as ultimatums: either Syria undertakes concrete measures to demonstrate restraint, measures which can be verified by UN officials, or the new sanctions will be implemented on a fixed date. The point is to get the UN acting as an enforcer of its policies rather than just a legislature handing down new rules.
One more thought to mention before I conclude. I've been realizing as I write this that the practicalities of a military intervention are not actually so important to me. This is probably for the best: I'm no military theorist and prognosticating on the issues and probable outcomes of a military operation would probably only be setting myself up to look foolish (not that this has actually stopped me in the past nor likely will in future). I'm confident in saying that the much denser human geography of Syria compared to Libya would make greater civilian casualties during a foreign intervention much more likely. But whether that would be the most important factor in determining the actual success, both objectively and in subjective international perceptions? I'd be naive to think I knew.
Instead, I've come down to making my judgment on ethical and ideological considerations. On that basis, I think my answer is actually in keeping with my initial instinct, and not the conclusion I expected I would reach when I sat down to start writing. I do not advocate foreign military intervention in Syria, except with broad and explicit UN approval which I do not expect. To be clear: I think the UN should intervene, and on a massive scale with a long, open-ended commitment. But I don't believe that's plausible. What I want is to make it plausible in the future. And I think the best way to get there is for the United States to show both restraint in pursuit of its agenda and a dedication to compromise and cooperation with other nations under the auspices of the international institutions it has helped to forge.
And of the killing in Syria and the future of the Arab Spring? I feel great regret over what I think we should do. But great hope for what Syrians may accomplish in spite of us.
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